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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine cultural characteristics in the context of economic affiliation and the timing of IFRS 
adoption. Prior work identifies cultural characteristics as key factors in the development of 
accounting systems world-wide. Our analysis extends this literature by showing that these same 
factors lead to economic clusters and to the propensity for adopting a universally accepted set of 
accounting rules. We contribute to the literature by demonstrating that, at least in one case, 
cultural factors are able to predict economic affiliations. Second, we provide evidence that certain 
cultural characteristic are affiliated with the delay in adoption of IFRS. Our results are valuable 
to local as well as international accounting standard setters as they look to negotiate common 
ground for convergence. Our examination of the cultural aspects distinctive in adoption patterns 
may provide insight into what specific aspects of the IFRS must be modified to expand and 
accelerate convergence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
rogress toward a universal conversion to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has been 
relatively quick in terms of the evolution of business practices. One of the more significant steps 
toward a universally accepted set of accounting standards occurred when the European Union required 
all constituent states to implement IFRS by 2005.  Indeed, in looking at a world map, well over 100 countries have 
already adopted IFRS and all continents are significantly impacted.
1
.   
 
Research continues to consider the cost-benefit relationship of IFRS adoption. Prior studies on the benefits 
of IFRS adoption address the commonly cited benefits of increased transparency, improved comparability, and 
greater foreign investment.  In the year following adoption, firms experience decreases in costs of capital and 
increases in market liquidity between 3-6% (Daske, 2008).  Late adopters (those adopting after 2006) benefit from 
the learning curve created by the earlier adopters.  Active promotion and training workshops address much of the 
uncertainty and mitigate the disadvantages experienced by first movers.  Beyond these advantages, countries adopt 
out of the fear that non-IFRS compliance will not encourage, and may decrease, foreign investment (Leng, 2008).   
 
Other research addresses the impediments to IFRS adoption and presents compelling arguments against the 
potential benefits derived from the proposed cost reductions. In countries with high levels of anti-fraud protection, 
the principles-based nature of IFRS adds concerns to the level of investor protection under the IFRS system. In 
2008, forty-four percent of all filed securities-fraud complaints cited a GAAP violation. The extensive rules-based 
nature of U.S. GAAP provides investors (plaintiffs) a greater degree of leverage in proving a material misstatement 
at trial.  The principles of IFRS do not offer the same advantage when proving misstatements in a court proceeding 
(Phillips, 2010). 
                                                 
1 For a full listing of IFRS adoption see:  http://www.iasb.org/Use+around+the+world/Use+around+the+world.htm 
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Prior research also asserts a link between the political prestige of a country and its willingness to adopt 
IFRS, with more powerful ones resisting IFRS to a greater extent than those with less political influence.  Countries 
that perceive IFRS adoption as ceding standard-setting power to the EU demonstrate a higher degree of aversion to 
IFRS.  Network trends may also exert influence on a country’s desire to participate in IFRS. Current data indicate a 
correlation between a country’s adoption of IFRS and its adoption by surrounding nations or by other countries with 
significant political standing (Ramanna, 2009).  
 
With the movement in international markets toward convergence to IFRS as either the default system of 
financial reporting or an alternative to the national system of reporting, the current research posits that cultural 
commonalities among adopting countries may impact the timing of such adoption.  The influence of culture on the 
development of accounting systems and financial reporting has been widely studied.  Hofstede’s work on mapping 
culture into four dimensions forms the basis of much of this inquiry.  Hofstede defines culture as the systematic 
programming of the mind and he posits (1980) that there are four cultural dimensions:  individualism (versus 
collectivism), power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity (versus femininity).  These dimensions impact 
the manner in which people process information. 
 
Individualism (IDV) is a measure of how much a society encourages individual accomplishments and loose 
relationships versus collective accomplishments and close relationships.  A society that ranks highly in 
individualism usually places importance on individual achievements, whereas one that ranks low in individualism 
focuses more on the importance of collective achievement.  (Hofstede, 1998.) 
 
Power Distance (PD) measures the degree of equality in a society.  One that ranks high in power distance 
places importance on status and is distinguished by differences between people in terms of wealth and power.  
Where power distance is low, fewer of these inequalities are noted and opportunities are available for all.  (Hofstede, 
1998.) 
 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) refers to a society’s ability to cope with the unknown.  High uncertainty 
avoidance means that the society feels more of a need to know future outcomes than one with low uncertainty 
avoidance.  Societies with high uncertainty avoidance generally have more laws (so as to be able to restrict the range 
of outcomes) whereas lower levels of uncertainty avoidance allow for a more open society.  (Hofstede, 1998.) 
 
Masculinity (MAS) is a measure of the traditional masculine traits of a society:  control, power, and 
achievement.  In a highly masculine society there would be significant differentiation between genders, while in 
more feminine societies there would exist a greater focus on people and their relationships to one another.  
(Hofstede, 1998.) 
 
DETERMINANTS OF ACCOUNTING VALUES 
 
Gray (1988) demonstrated how cultural factors affect the development of accounting values and how an 
agreed upon set of accounting values gives rise to the development of accounting systems (internationally).  Gray 
posited four accounting values arising from Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.  He extended the model of corporate 
reporting to include: 
 
 External influences – such as trade and investment;  
 Ecological influences – such as geographic and historical;  
 Cultural dimensions – power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity (femininity), individualism 
(collectivism); 
 Accounting Values – such as professionalism, uniformity, secrecy, and conservatism; 
 Institutional Consequences – such as legal systems and education; and,  
 Accounting Systems – such as authority, enforcement, measurement, and disclosure.   
 
Nobes (1998) reduced the variables in Gray’s (1988) system to two distinct variables, which he called 
culture and the nature of the accounting systems.  He asserted that these differences are the result of the distinct 
outcomes desired by each of the national systems. 
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CULTURAL INFLUENCES OF ECONOMIC AFFILIATION  
 
Historically, distinct desired outcomes have led to the development of different reporting mechanisms 
within financial accounting standards, but more recent changes in the world business environment have made such a 
multiplicity of financial reporting rules undesirable.  First and foremost among these is the inability to compare 
international financial statements without considerable effort on the part of the stakeholder.  While international 
investment opportunities traditionally have been more limited, technological innovations have led to an increase in 
the number of stakeholders desiring to acquire international equity, thus increasing the number of individuals and 
businesses impacted by international accounting diversity.  Standard-setting bodies and national regulatory agencies 
have reacted to this problem largely by adopting IFRS as a compliment to, or in replacement of, their older national 
standards.  This adoption has allowed international investors to make comparisons between companies on 
differentiated securities exchanges much more easily, as this can be done without significant (or frequently any) 
conversions of the financial reports. 
 
Prior literature shows that countries with similar values on the Hofstede measures tend to have other social 
similarities including business activities (Lin et al., 2008). Further, research shows that countries with similar 
cultural foundations are more likely to trade with one-another.  Membership in the European Union offers benefits 
such as trade and the ability of citizens to move between member states for employment.  Membership also has its 
obligations, however.  One of these is the requirement for consolidated financial reporting, where publicly traded 
companies must use IFRS as the reporting medium.  Thus, as a precursor to a larger discussion of adoption of IFRS 
in the world economies, the Union may have experienced a centric cultural migration in order to facilitate the 
formation of such a cohesive economic policy.  Because economic affiliations tend to form along cultural 
similarities, we expect that the numeric values in Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are associated with European 
Union membership. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Cultural factors are associated with European Union membership. 
 
A comprehensively comparable system of financial reporting is undoubtedly valuable; however, varying 
levels of resistance to IFRS adoption remain. In light of the obvious benefits of an international set of standards, we 
posit that resistance to or delay in IFRS adoption is related to relatively stable cultural, societal, and economic 
factors.  Higher levels of IDV, MAS, and UA are expected to be associated with later adoption of IFRS.  Higher 
values of PD are expected to be associated with earlier adoption of IFRS. 
 
In addition to the Hofstede measures, we anticipate that other country-specific factors influence the timing 
of IFRS adoption.  Prior literature shows that a country’s native accounting system is heavily influenced by that 
country’s economic and legal systems.  Accordingly, we expect that the economic and legal systems of a country 
will influence the timing of IFRS adoption. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Cultural characteristics, size of the economy, legal system, economic affiliation, and economic 
market orientation (micro vs. macro) affect the timing of IFRS adoption.   
 
Sample 
 
Our analysis examines the relationship between the cultural characteristics of 37 
2
countries and the timing 
of IFRS adoption.  According to the IASB, as of the end of 2009, over 100 sovereigns have adopted IFRS as their 
primary authoritative financial reporting regime (IASB 2010).  Hofstede measures are available for 23 of these 
countries.  An additional 14 countries which have not yet adopted IFRS, but do have Hofstede measures available, 
are also included in our study.  The dataset is presented as Table 1. 
 
                                                 
2 Our total sample consists of 39 countries. We utilize all 39 countries in our examination of European Union membership. 
However, because the information concerning the legal systems of Iran and Turkey does not exist in the MICRO/MACRO 
framework, those two countries are excluded from our analysis of IFRS adoption. Therefore, only 37 countries are included in the 
analysis of characteristics relating to the timing of IFRS adoption. 
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Table 1:  Data Set and Variable Names 
COUNTRY ADOPTION3 DELAY MAS IDV UA PD LEGAL MACRO UNION GNP 
Argentina 2011 9 56 46 86 49 1 1 0 284.20 
Australia 2005 3 61 90 51 36 1 0 0 389.96 
Austria 2005 3 79 55 70 11 1 1 0 191.76 
Belgium 2005 3 54 75 94 65 1 1 1 232.63 
Brazil 2010 8 49 38 76 69 1 1 0 644.28 
Canada 2011 9 52 80 48 39 1 0 0 725.16 
Chile 2010 8 28 23 86 63 1 1 0 75.20 
Colombia 2016 14 64 13 80 67 1 1 0 94.08 
Denmark 2005 3 16 74 23 18 1 1 1 160.53 
Finland 2005 3 26 63 59 33 1 1 1 122.15 
France 2005 3 43 71 86 68 1 1 1 1,333.20 
Germany  2005 3 66 67 65 35 1 1 1 1,905.80 
Great Britain 2005 3 66 89 35 35 1 0 1 1,480.53 
Greece 2005 3 57 35 112 60 1 1 1 127.60 
Hong Kong 2005 3 57 25 29 68 1 0 0 169.12 
India 2016 14 56 48 40 77 1 0 0 461.91 
Iran 2016 14 43 41 59 58 0 1 . 96.44 
Ireland 2005 3 68 70 35 28 1 0 1 96.88 
Israel 2008 6 47 54 81 13 0 1 0 123.69 
Italy 2016 14 70 76 75 50 1 1 1 1,100.56 
Japan 2015 13 95 46 92 54 1 1 0 4,668.79 
Mexico 2012 10 69 30 82 81 1 1 0 628.85 
Netherlands 2005 3 14 80 53 38 1 0 1 386.20 
New Zealand 2002 0 58 79 49 22 1 0 0 2.37 
Norway 2005 3 8 69 50 31 0 1 1 168.67 
Pakistan 2009 7 50 14 70 55 1 1 0 74.08 
Peru 2016 14 42 16 87 64 1 1 0 53.32 
Philippines 2005 3 64 32 44 94 0 0 0 75.91 
Portugal 2005 3 31 27 104 63 1 1 1 112.98 
Singapore 2016 14 48 20 8 74 1 0 0 92.72 
South Africa 2003 1 63 65 49 49 0 0 0 132.96 
Spain  2005 3 42 51 86 57 1 1 1 582.38 
Sweden 2005 3 5 71 29 31 1 1 1 246.37 
Switzerland 2016 14 70 68 58 34 1 1 0 250.20 
Taiwan 2016 14 45 17 69 58 1 0 0 321.37 
Thailand 2016 14 34 20 64 64 1 1 0 122.73 
Turkey 2008 6 45 37 85 66 1 1 . 266.44 
USA 2014 12 62 91 46 40 1 0 0 9,816.98 
Venezuela 2008 6 73 12 76 81 0 1 0 117.15 
 
 
Correlations for all variables in the study are provided in Table 2.  
 
Table 2:  Univariate Correlations 
 IDV MAS PD UA MACRO LEGAL EU 
IDV 1.000         
MAS (0.038)  1.000           
PD (0.660) *** 0.150 1.000         
UA (0.329) ** 0.163 0.260  1.000      
MACRO (0.268) (0.145) 0.001 0.640 *** 1.000     
LEGAL 0.091 0.022 (0.067) 0.074 0.040  1.000   
EU 0.454 *** (0.395) ** (0.283) * 0.027 0.224  0.171  1.000 
GNP 0.326 ** 0.287 * (0.088) (0.026)  (0.148)  0.152  (0.063) 
Significance at the p<.100, p<.050, and p<.001 levels are indicated with '*', '**', and '***', respectively.    
                                                 
3
 Adoption reflects the year in which the country either has adopted or plans to adopt IFRS. Of the countries with stated 
intentions, all plan to adopt not later than 2015. Any country without a stated adoption timeline is assigned 2016. In the context 
of our model, this means that we assume any country without a stated plan will adopt later than all those with a plan. 
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Power distance (PD) and individualism (IDV) exhibit a large and statistically significant correlation.  
Further, three Hofstede measures, power distance (PD), masculinity (MAS), and individualism (IDV), have 
statistically significant correlations with membership in the European Union (EU).   
 
METHODS 
 
Cultural factors related to economic affiliation 
 
We present the univariate statistics for the Hofstede measures dependent on European Union membership.  
Table 3 provides univariate descriptive statistics for the Hofstede measures for the entire sample, EU members, and 
non-members.  In order to test our first hypothesis, we employ a logistic regression using the Hofstede variables to 
predict EU membership.  That is, we construct a model that predicts the probability that a country is a member of the 
European Union using only the four Hofstede measures as shown here in equation (1).   
 
ln (odds ratio that EU=1) = b0 + b1 IDV +  b2 PD + b3 UA + b4 MAS  (1) 
 
The estimation results of equation (1) are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 3:  Univariate Analysis of Hofstede Metrics by EU Membership 
Full Sample IDV MAS PD UA 
 Mean 50.72 50.67 51.23 63.87 
 Median 51.00 54.00 55.00 65.00 
 Standard Deviation 24.82 19.64 20.13 23.73 
 Maximum 12.00 5.00 11.00 8.00 
 Minimum 91.00 95.00 94.00 112.00 
      
EUUNION=1 IDV MAS PD UA 
 Mean 65.57 40.43 43.71 64.71 
 Median 70.50 42.50 36.50 62.00 
 Standard Deviation 17.01 23.71 16.24 28.85 
 Maximum 27.00 5.00 18.00 23.00 
 Minimum 89.00 70.00 68.00 112.00 
      
EUUNION=0 IDV MAS PD UA 
 Mean 42.40 56.40 55.44 63.40 
 Median 38.00 56.00 58.00 69.00 
 Standard Deviation 24.86 14.53 21.15 20.98 
 Maximum 12.00 28.00 11.00 8.00 
 Minimum 91.00 95.00 94.00 92.00 
      
T-test for differences between European Union membership   
 Hypothesized direction for EU non-members Lower Higher Higher Higher 
 Difference in mean (23.17) 15.97 11.73 (1.31) 
 One-tailed p-value (assume unequal variances) 0.0019 0.0064 0.0404 0.5645 
      
 Hypothesis supported? Yes Yes Yes No 
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Table 4:  Classification Model for European Union Membership 
Panel A: Logistic estimation    
       Coefficient Standard Error Z-statistic p-value 
IDV           0.0945  0.0378 2.5000 0.0120 
PD           0.0045  0.0360 0.1200 0.9010 
UA           0.0607  0.0321 1.8900 0.0590 
MAS          (0.0769) 0.0309 (2.4900) 0.0130 
Constant          (6.2823) 3.9501 (1.5900) 0.1120 
     
Number of obs =                  39    
Log likelihood =        (14.8152)    
LR chi2(4) =         21.2900     
Prob > chi2 =           0.0003     
Pseudo R2 =           0.4181     
     
     
Panel B: Classification table    
  Actual EU Membership 
  Non-Member Member Total 
 Predicted as a non-Member 21 4 25 
 Predicted as a Member 4 10 14 
 Total 25 14 39 
     
                   Correct classification percent1  
  Current model 79.5% 
  Naïve model percent 64.1% 
1 A classification model is valuable only if it is able to predict group member ship more accurately than is the naive model. 
Classification in the naive model is achieved by simply classifying all observations in the largest group. So in this case, the naive 
model is correct in approximately 64 percent (25/39) of the cases. Our model is able to accurately classify the dataset in 
approximately 80 percent ((21 +10)/39) of the cases.  
 
 
The logistic model explains approximately 42 percent of the variation in European Union membership and 
is significant at the p < .001 level.  IDV, MAS, and UA are significant at conventional levels.  Power Distance (PD) 
is not significant in the model.  As reported in Panel B of Table 4, our model is able to correctly classify 31 of the 39 
countries with regard to EU membership.  Under a naive classification model, only 25 out of 39 countries are 
correctly classified.
4
 The results of our classification model lend support to the notion that cultural factors are 
associated with economic affiliation.  
 
The coefficients estimated in a logistic regression are odds ratios.  An odds ratio is the odds (or chances) of 
being in one group divided by the odds (or chances) of not being in that group. Therefore, an odds ratio greater than 
1.0 indicates that an increase in the value of the variable increases the odds of being in the EU more than it increases 
the odds of not being in the EU.  Accordingly, higher levels in IDV and UA increase the odds ratio for inclusion in 
the EU.  Because the odds ratio for MAS is less than 1.0, decreases in MAS result in higher odds ratios for inclusion 
in the EU.  PD exhibits the hypothesized odds ratio effect (greater than 1.0), however, the estimate is not statistically 
discernible.  All other variables exhibit odds ratio that are significant at conventional levels with hypothesized 
effect.  Therefore, we claim support for our first hypothesis. 
  
Factors related to the timing of IFRS adoption 
 
Our second hypothesis asserts that the timing of IFRS adoption is influenced by the Hofstede measures as 
well as other country-specific characteristics illustrated in equation (2) below. The timing of adoption (DELAY) is 
computed for each country as the number of years elapsing between the initial date of 2002 and the year of IFRS 
                                                 
4 A naive model simply classifies all observations (countries) in the largest group. Therefore, the naive model in this case 
classifies all 39 countries as EU members. The naive model is correct in approximately 64 percent of the cases. 
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adoption or intended adoption.
5
 For countries that have not set a specific date for adoption, we assign 2016 as the 
adoption year.
6
 Countries adopting in later years have higher values of DELAY than countries adopting in early 
years. 
 
In addition to the Hofstede measures, we include a variable MACRO which takes on the value of 1 if the 
country tends toward a centrally managed economy and 0 otherwise.  Countries with a centrally managed economy 
are associated with lower levels of political influence from users of financial statements, and are therefore better 
able to simply impose IFRS.  MACRO is expected to be associated with earlier adoptions.  
 
The status that accounting policy holds within a country is closely related to that country’s legal system.  
Legal systems arising from common law typically treat accounting rules as guidance, whereas legal systems arising 
from code law typically treat accounting rules as law.  We represent the legal system with the variable LGL, which 
takes on the value of 1 if the country employs code law and the value of 0 if it utilizes common law.  We have no 
specific hypothesized direction for this variable. 
 
We include per capita gross national product (GNP) in our model as a proxy for the existing level of 
productivity of a country.  Higher productivity is expected to increase the resistance to IFRS adoption.  As a specific 
example, the U.S. is the largest economy not having adopted IFRS, making a control for economic activity 
necessary to isolate the effect of the Hofstede measures.  Finally, we include a control variable EU to indicate if a 
country is a member of the European Union.  Due to the mandated adoption of IRFS by all member nations in 2005 
a control for EU membership is necessary. 
 
Because of the strong correlations among the Hofstede measures, and the fact that the Hofstede measures 
are able to predict EU membership, we suspect a collinearity problem when testing our second hypothesis.  To 
demonstrate the severity of the problem, we compute the variance inflation factors (VIF) for each independent 
variable in equation (2). Table 5 reports the individual VIFs and average VIFs for our variables. 
 
DELAY = b0 + b1 IDV + b2 PD + b3 UA + b4 MAS + b5 MACRO + b6 LEGAL + b7 EU + b8 GNP + e        (2) 
 
 
Table 5:  Variance Inflation Factors1 
 Variable  VIF 
H
o
fs
te
d
e IDV  3.35  
MICRO  2.29  
PD  2.14  
UA  2.12  
 EU  2.01  
 MAS  1.50  
 GNP  1.34  
 LEGAL  1.06  
    
Mean VIF   
 Hofstede variables  2.48  
 All variables  1.98  
1Variance inflation factors (VIF) report the degree to which collinearity among the variables causes the variance (and therefore 
the standard error) to be overstated. Overstated variances (standard errors) increase the likelihood of a type II error. Generally, 
single variable VIF values in excess of 10 are considered evidence of a severe collinearity problem. (Myers 1990) Additionally, 
Bowerman and O'Connel (1990) suggest that if the average VIF is greater than 1, then the collinearity problem will likely bias the 
standard errors sufficiently to induce inflated standard errors. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The first formal adoption of IFRS occurred in 2002. Therefore, the DELAY variable for a country adopting in that year is zero.  
6 For countries that have not yet set an adoption year, we assign an adoption year of 2016. This equates to setting the DELAY 
variable equal to 14 (2016-2002). This assignment of adoption year permits us to compute a DELAY variable for these countries 
that is larger than for all countries that have set an adoption date. Further, the assignment of adoption year allows us to retain the 
countries without an adoption date and is the latest anticipated adoption date by US firms.      
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Bowerman and O'Connel (1990) suggest that if the average VIF is greater than 1, then the collinearity 
problem will likely bias the standard errors sufficiently to induce inflated standard errors. The average VIF for all 
variables in our model is 1.98 and the average VIF for the Hofstede variables is 2.48. Our variables exhibit VIF 
levels well beyond the point where a collinearity problem is indicated.
7
 Severe collinearity problems can lead to 
inflated variances (almost by a factor of two in this case) and overstated standard errors, which will typically 
obscure the underlying relationships of interest.  Much of the literature refers to this situation as an over-specified 
model, because the high collinearity indicates that the unique information represented by each of the variables in the 
model is small.  The remedy is often to drop those variables responsible for inducing the collinearity in the model.  
In our case, however, it is the variables of interest that induce the collinearity.  Therefore, we look to an alternative 
remedy for the collinearity problem: a ridge regression.
8,9
  
 
A ridge regression addresses the inflated variance problem by using a best-fit method rather than the least-
squares approach employed by typical linear regression.
10
 Therefore, we re-estimate equation 3 as a ridge regression. 
In our implementation of the ridge regression we test for the sensitivity of our results to alternative variance inflation 
adjustment parameters (i.e., VIF corrections). Our model and findings are robust to alternative variance inflation 
parameters.
11
  The results are found in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6:  Ridge Regression Results 
DELAY = b0 + b1IDV +  b2PD + b3UA + b4MAS + b5MACRO + b6LEGAL + b7EU + b8GNP + e 
  Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic p-value   
 IDV 0.2643 0.0888 2.9800 0.0060   
 PD (0.2180) 0.0996 (2.1900) 0.0370   
 UA 0.1991 0.1141 1.7400 0.0920   
 MAS 0.2817 0.1375 2.0500 0.0500   
 MACRO (0.0436) 0.1630 (0.2700) 0.7910   
 LEGAL (0.4371) 0.1788 (2.4500) 0.0210   
 EU 0.2327 0.2531 0.9200 0.3660   
 GNP 0.2544 0.3287 0.7700 0.4450   
        
 Observations1 37      
 F-test 0.0059      
 Adjusted R2 0.3616      
1 The regression model excludes Iran and Turkey because both countries lack data necessary for the MACRO variable.  
 
 
Based on Table 3, we find that DELAY is positively and significantly (p < .01) associated with the Hofstede 
measure of individualism (IDV).  Since individualism values independent thought and a concern for one’s own and 
one’s immediate friends and family over the good to society as a whole, it would follow that if the individuals 
thought that superior (or at a minimum well-known to those in question) financial information was being generated, 
                                                 
7 The variance inflation factor (VIF) measures the degree that the variances are overstated. Therefore, a VIF of 1.98 indicates that 
the average variance estimates are overstated by a factor of roughly 2.0. 
8 Ridge regression was formally introduced by Hoerl and Kennard (1970). The Ridge Regression procedure addresses the 
instability of OLS due to the near singularity of X'X. (Anemiya 1985). 
9 Yet another solution for collinearity is to apply a factor analysis and use the new variables (factors) in the analysis. We apply 
this method using an oblique rotation and a total of four factors are generated. We find that the newly created variables (factors) 
are all significantly associated with DELAY at conventional levels. The model is also significant. While this supports our overall 
hypothesis, we do not present it formally because interpretation of the factors in the context of our hypotheses is not possible.   
10 While this approach induces some bias in the parameter estimates, it is able to circumvent the larger problem of variance 
inflation associated with collinearity in linear regression. For a complete discussion of ridge regressions, see Hoerl and Kennard 
(1970) and Anemiya  (1985) 
11 We report and discuss the results based on the parameters that optimally address the variance inflation in our data.  The results 
are consistent with those reported here.  We center the data and impose a variance of 1 for all variables.  Therefore, the ridge 
results are interpreted in terms of changes in standardized Z-scores.  Further we also replicate our analysis using a maximum 
likelihood estimation approach to ascertain if the normality assumptions are valid. 
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the individuals involved might advocate either not joining IFRS or might exercise greater caution which would 
result in a longer adoption time for the financial regulators.  Thus, a greater sense of independence, or a lower need 
for belonging, is associated with a longer delay in the adoption of IFRS. 
 
The negative relationship between DELAY and PD is significant at the p < .05 level.  PD measures the 
degree to which differences in relative power or authority is accepted in the society.  Smaller levels in the PD 
measure reflect a greater degree of comfort with disparate power and authority.  This variable is negatively related to 
DELAY reflecting the tendency for those cultures with lower acceptance of power differentials to adopt later.  This is 
indicative of those within the culture desiring a sense of control over their own destiny, in this case their financial 
reporting, and not wishing to cede control to an international/outside group to set the rules, and effectively the 
playing field, under which they would operate.  A lack of comfort would be felt because the power to set the rules 
would lie outside of what would be perceived as the individual’s realm of influence, causing those in charge of 
making the decision to move to IFRS to put off such a determination, which in turn causes the country to adopt these 
outside rules later than a country whose constituency had higher power distance scores.   
 
Masculinity (MAS) is significantly (p < .050) and positively related to DELAY, so increasing levels of 
masculinity are associated with greater delays in the adoption of IFRS.  Since masculinity suggests a lack of needing 
to belong to a group and more of a business drive, countries with higher masculinity scores would likely resist the 
adoption of IFRS from their national systems which had been developed specifically for their business needs. The 
final tested Hofstede cultural dimension, uncertainty avoidance (UA), is significant at the (p < .100) level in 
influencing the DELAY variable.  This indicates that increased levels of uncertainty avoidance are related to longer 
adoption times for IFRS.  This is interesting because it implies that individuals in charge of the adoption process are 
likely being influenced by the desire to know the outcomes of the financial decisions, thus they wish to stick with 
the familiar home-country financial disclosure requirements.  Thus although eventually adopting IFRS, it may take 
the constituency longer to get familiar and comfortable with the outcomes associated with using IFRS as the 
financial reporting method and thus longer adoption periods are required to make the transition. So, increasing 
degrees of discomfort with uncertainty is associated with larger delays in adoption. 
 
Finally, DELAY is also significantly (p < .050) negatively associated with the LEGAL variable; a legal 
environment more closely tied to common law is associated with an increase in the DELAY variable.  Contributions 
made by other variables in the model are not statistically significant in predicting a country’s movement to IFRS.  
This research extends the work of Clements, Neill, and Stovall (2010) by suggesting the importance of certain 
elements of culture and the legal environment in predicting when a country will adopt IFRS.    
  
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION  
 
The importance of cultural norms on social behavior and systems organizing them is well established in the 
literature. We extend the literature first by establishing that culture plays an important role in a country’s decision to 
join the European Union, and second, by demonstrating that these cultural factors influence the rapidity with which 
countries have embraced IFRS as their primary financial reporting mechanism.  Through an examination of 39 
countries, we find support for the claim that the cultural characteristics and the legal variable are associated with the 
timing of conversion to a common international financial reporting system.  To the extent that we view financial 
reporting as one of the languages of business, serving both to provide useful information and also an agency 
solution, it seems reasonable to expect that cultural norms would be central to the adoption of IFRS; cultural factors 
continue to maintain their influence even within our globalized economy. 
 
We identify two important limitations to our analysis.  First, countries without reported Hofstede measures 
were excluded from our analysis. Also, because two countries (Iran and Turkey) have data for all variables except 
MACRO, they are included in our entire analysis with the exception of the ridge regression in Table 6. Therefore, 
our analysis incorporates 39 countries with the exception for the ridge regression, which is based on 37 countries. 
Second, the international conversion to IFRS is far from complete.  We analyze the historical adoption and intended 
adoption and make an assumption about those countries not yet claiming a conversion date; the dependent variable 
in our analysis (DELAY) is then estimated for those countries not having adopted.  Our study will need to be 
revisited if countries initiate an adoption timeline different from that currently reported. 
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